中有问题——世亲众贤的观点

前一阵，我在《华林》（Hualin International Journal of Buddhist Studies ）上看到一篇写阿毗达磨的文章。我平常的习惯是，看到文章有写错的地方，记下来，直接发在豆瓣或公号上。不过，那篇文章里，作者的一个重要观点是有问题的，邮箱又在PDF的开头，我就给作者发了邮件，举了5个问题。作者认可了细节问题，但对于重要观点（第1条），他说不确定引文能反驳他的观点，又把他最近（2023）发表在Religious Studies 上的文章发给我，问我是否看过。

我读了一遍，发现仍然存在问题，就列了6处发给他。有些是细节，有些牵涉到论文的核心结论。这可能让他有点不愉快。他说，第一条，也许你是对的，但你也不能否认我就不对；第三到五条，我不认为我们的观点有什么不同，除了一些小细节，你提的就像我文章的摘要；第六条，我不明白你的逻辑。第六条是牵涉到他结论的一条。 由 于我之前已经附上了 相关文本，他说不明白，我就又把文本（《顺正理论》《显宗论》）简单翻译成英文解释了一遍。 他没有再表态。
现在，我把学术讨论的部分发出来（略去了称呼和寒暄）。以下三封，都节选自我发给他的邮件。第一封是关于他《华林》（2020）那篇；后两封是关于他Religious Studies（2023）那篇。两篇网上都不难搜到。

邮件一：

I have read your article "Survivability: Vasubandhu and Saṅghabhadra on the Continuity of the Life of a Sentient Being as Translated by Xuanzang." I would like to share with you some of my views on related issues.

1.

P177：the four psychological skandhas of a deceased sentient being are carried in the saṃtāna from the previous life, into an intermediate state, and then reincar- nated into another life form. The psychological aspects of a sentient being, such as dispositions, memories, and states of consciousness, survive the death of the body, transmigration, and reincarnation bundled within the saṃtāna of the four skandhas.

P193:The four skandhas of the deceased being, and the ephemeral rūpaskandha, are collected to- gether in a saṃtāna to form an upapāduka, an intermediate being.

You seem to think that, in an intermediate being, the four skandhas are still of the same nature as before death, only the rūpaskandha has changed. I don’t think so, and I would like to present a passage from the Mahāvibhāṣā.

《阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論》卷192：「諸捨欲有色有相續。彼一切欲界法滅色界法現在前耶。答諸捨欲有色有相續。彼一切欲界法滅色界法現在前。謂欲界命終生色界。從死有往中有時。捨欲有者。謂欲界死有。色有相續者謂色界中有。欲界法滅者謂欲界死有諸蘊。色界法現在前者[6]謂色界中有諸蘊。」(CBETA 2023.Q1, T27, no. 1545, p. 961c1-7)[6] 謂【大】，諸【宮】

2.

P194-195：The editors of the *Mahāvibhāṣā are agnostic on the question of the full duration of the antarābhava, although they endorse Vasumitra’s view that there is no determinate duration for the intermediate state within the timeline of either one, or seven, weeks. They cite the view: ‘Bhadanta (Vasumitra) is of the opinion that there is no determi- nate limit…… 大德說曰, 此無定限. 謂彼生緣, 速和合者. 此中有身, 即少時住. 若彼生緣, 多時未合. 此中有身, 即多時住. 乃至緣合, 方得結生. 故中有身, 住無 定限.

You seem to think that Bhadanta 大德 is Vasumitra 世友. In fact, Bhadanta should be 法救(曇摩多羅).

《鞞婆沙論》卷14：「尊者婆須蜜說曰：中陰者當言七日住、當言過耶？答曰：中陰住當言七日。何以故？身羸故住七日，不過七[2]日。問曰：謂滿七日父母不合會者，彼時為斷耶？答曰：不斷，但還生中陰。重說曰：中陰者當言七七日。尊者曇摩多羅說曰：中陰者，父母不合會亦可久時住。」(CBETA 2023.Q1, T28, no. 1547, p. 518b19-25)[2] 日【大】，〔－〕【宋】【元】【明】【宮】

《說一切有部為主的論書與論師之研究》：「唐譯的達磨邏怛多，就是法救的音譯（晉譯《鞞婆沙論》，譯為曇摩多羅。涼譯《毘婆沙論》，譯為達磨多羅）。唐譯所引，有「大德法救」說，有更多的「大德」說。大德就是大德法救的略稱，還是另有其人呢？」(CBETA 2023.Q1, Y36, no. 34, p. 246a1-3)

3.

P195-196: That is to say, it is because of the fact that the minority of beings in both the two (i.e., humans and devas) and three (i.e., non-human animals, pretas, and narakas) destinies of rebirth, as well as all of the intermediate beings, are born through spontaneous generation’. 化生最多, 謂二趣全三趣少分及諸中有. 皆化生故.

You seem to interpret "all two destinations" 二趣全 as humans and devas. In fact, "all two destinations" should be narakas 地獄 and devas 諸天.

《阿毘達磨俱舍論》卷8：「人傍生具四，  地獄及諸天， 中有唯化生，  鬼通胎化二。」(CBETA 2023.Q1, T29, no. 1558, p. 43c22-23)

4.

P197：while the seven physical faculties (Skt. sapta-rūpêndriyāṇi; Ch. qi youse gen 七有色根), a rubric including the five ordinary senses (1–5), procreation (6), and vitality (7), are grouped together under the rūpaskandha.

In fact, vitality 命根 is not "rūpaskandha" 色蘊, but "saṃskāraskandha" 行蘊. Procreation includes "male faculty" and "female faculty" which are two kinds of faculties.

《阿毘達磨俱舍論》卷4：「心不相應行，  得非得同分， 無想二定命，  相名身等類。論曰：如是諸法心不相應，非色等性，行蘊所攝，是故名心不相應行。」(CBETA 2023.Q1, T29, no. 1558, p. 22a6-9)

5.

P199：In the *Samyuktâbhidharmahṛdaya, the upapādukas are depicted as possessing a minimum of three faculties: mind, vitality, and tactition (Skt. kāyêndriya), and a maximum of eight faculties: the female and male procreative faculties, five physical senses, and vitality.

P200：The forth hemistich of this quatrain reads that ‘[when the upapādukas are ini- tially born]...they have six [faculties] in the rūpadhātu and one [faculty] in the arūpadhātu’. 色六無色一. The six faculties pertaining to upapādukas in the rūpadhātu are the ‘five physical [sensory] faculties, vitality, and one faculty of procreation, if bimodally gendered; if hermaphroditic, eight’. 五色根及命根; 一形七二形八.

"色六無色一" refers to the stage of upapattibhava 生有, not antarābhava 中有. In addition, "色六無色一" refers to "vipākendriyas" 異熟根, that is, "retribution" 報. Other faculties possessed by the being are not counted here because they are not 異熟(報). "謂五色根及命根，一形七、二形八" refers to the situation in the desire realm, not the form realm.

《雜阿毘曇心論》卷8〈8 修多羅品〉：「問：幾是報？幾非報？答：十二中是報，謂色根七，有是報有非報，如界品說；意根及四受，或是報或非報，若善不[22]善果[23]是報。命根唯是報者，命根一向是報。有欲令是正受果。問：初生時得幾根報？答：二或六七八，  最初生時得， 當知欲界報，  色六無色一。」(CBETA 2023.Q1, T28, no. 1552, p. 940c10-16)[22] 善【大】，善業【宮】【聖】【聖乙】　[23] 是【大】，〔－〕【宮】

《阿毘達磨俱舍論》卷3〈2 分別根品〉：「何界初得幾異熟根？頌曰：欲胎卵濕生，  初得二異熟， 化生六七八，  色六上唯命。論曰：欲胎、卵、濕生初受生位，唯得身與命二異熟根，由此三生根漸起故。彼何不得意、捨二根？此續生時定染污故。化生初位得六七八，謂無形者初得六根，如劫初時。何等為六？所謂眼、耳、鼻、舌、身、命。若一形者初得七根，如諸天等。若二形者初得八根。豈有二形受化生者？惡趣容有二形化生。說欲界中初得根已。今[6]次當說色無色界。欲界欲勝故但言欲，色界色勝故但言色。契經亦言：寂靜解脫，過色無色。色界初得六異熟根，如欲化生無形者說。上唯命者，謂無色界定勝生勝，故說上言。無色界中最初所得異熟根者，唯命非餘。說異熟根最初得已……」(CBETA 2023.Q1, T29, no. 1558, pp. 16c18-17a4)[6] 次【大】，欲【宋】【元】【明】

邮件二：

The question mentioned in the last email, my answer is: yes. For those who have come to the form realm, the five aggregates are all belonging to the form realm. "欲界法滅者謂欲界死有諸蘊。色界法現在前者謂色界中有諸蘊"; "various" (諸) of "various aggregates" (諸蘊), indicates that it is not only one kind of aggregate. Or, I can also quote another paragraph to try to explain.

《阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論》卷53：「有結在欲界彼結非[1]墮欲界。謂纏所纏欲界沒起色界中有。欲界沒生色界者。通異生及聖者。彼色界中有在欲界起法應如是。死有滅處中有現前。如種滅處萌芽現前。彼從死有至中有時。若異生色界三十一隨眠隨一現前令生相續。若聖者色界修所斷三隨眠隨一現前令生相續。」(CBETA 2023.Q1, T27, no. 1545, p. 273a8-14)[1] 墮【大】，隋【宋】【元】【明】，隨【宮】

Here, the "thirty-one afflictions of the form realm" (色界三十一隨眠) belongs to the "saṃskāraskandha" (行蘊), they are mental factors (心所法). Because these mental factors correspond (相應) to the "mind" and correspond to the "sensation" (受心所) and "perception" (想心所), then, the consciousness aggregate (識蘊), sensation aggregate (受蘊) and perception aggregate (想蘊) are also belonging to the form realm. Therefore, for antarābhava in the form realm, the five aggregates in the continuum (相續) are all belonging to the form realm.

Regarding your new paper, I also have different views on the following details.

1.

P13：Saṅghabhadra maintains that plants and other insentient beings – whether living or not – are composed of only one aggregate (that of bodily form), whereas only sentient beings are composed of all five. As Saṅghabhadra’s avers in his Nyāyānusāra: ‘Insentient beings are constituted in only one aggregate (i.e. rūpaskandha)’ (無有情唯具一蘊) (T1562.29.402c11).

It seems that you understand "無" and "有情" together as "Insentient beings" (無有情, 非情). For "無有情唯具一蘊", my understanding is this: there are no sentient beings with only one skandha. "無" denies "有情唯具一蘊". The following "亦無有情唯具三蘊" is the same understanding: there are no sentient beings with only three skandhas. In other words, sentient beings can have five skandhas (born in the kāmadhātu and rūpadhātu), four skandhas (born in the ārūpyadhātu), or two skandhas (when entering nirodha-samāpatti 滅受想定).

《阿毘達磨順正理論》卷12：「故無有情唯具一蘊。又心心所不相離故，亦無有情唯具三蘊。」(CBETA 2023.Q1, T29, no. 1562, p. 402c11-12)

2.

P13：In his Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, Vasubandhu avers that there is no antarābhava undergone by sentient beings who perish and immediately become reborn within the formless realm (T1558.29.46a18; see also 3.37d).

It seems that you think no antarābhava requires two conditions to be met: 1. Perish within the formless realm; 2. Reborn within the formless realm. In my view, only the latter condition needs to be met: reborn within the formless realm. That is to say, if a sentient being in the kāmadhātu or rūpadhātu dies and is reborn in the ārūpyadhātu, it is also no antarābhava ("謂欲色界歿生無色界唯生生有"). As for the sentient beings who die in the ārūpyadhātu and are reborn in the kāmadhātu or rūpadhātu, there is antarābhava. You have already cited evidence for the latter point. There is another passage that can prove both points at the same time:

《阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論》卷68：「無色界歿生欲界者。謂生中有。此唯異生。此中非在色界死者。謂無色界死有在無色界滅故。非在色界生者。謂欲界中有在欲界起故。非受色有者謂受欲有。即受欲界中有諸蘊。諸在無色界死生者皆受無色有耶。答諸在無色界死生者皆受無色有。謂無色界無諸色故。無下中有在彼起義。故不可說在彼死生不受彼有。此通異生及諸聖者。異生生上亦生下一一處容受多生。聖者生上不生下一一處唯受一生。有受無色有非在無色界死而[4]在無色界生。謂欲色界歿生無色界唯生生有。此通異生及諸聖者。此中受無色有者謂受無色界生有諸蘊。非在無色界死者。謂欲色界死有在欲色界滅故。而在無色界生者。謂無色界生有在無色界起故。」(CBETA 2023.Q1, T27, no. 1545, p. 353c1-18)[4] 在【大】，生【宋】【元】【明】【宮】

3.

P9：He reasons that, because the stuff making up the reflection in the mirror and the mirror are ‘not equiva- lent’ (Skt. asādharmya; Chi. budeng 不等) in both being ‘actual entities’ (Skt. bhāva),……

P9：The real existence of the reflection is not logically established (Skt. asiddha); because the [stuff making up the mirror and the reflection] are not equivalent [in that they do not form a single continuum],……

P14：As Xuanzang’s rendition of Vasubandhu’s prose auto-commentary to Abhidharmakośa 3.11cd elaborates: Again, [the reflection and the stuff comprising the mirror] are not equivalent [in that they do not form a single continuum], so the example is logically unestablished (asiddha). That is to say that ‘reflection’ refers to a separate physical entity. Its real existence as an entity is not logically established. In stipulating non-equivalence [between the continua of the reflection and of the stuff of the mirror], the example is thus logically unestablished. When it is said [in the above stanza] that ‘the real existence of the reflection is not established’, this is because of the fact that two physical entities cannot simultaneously occupy one and the same spatial locus. That is to say that even if the physical stuff of the mirror and the reflection appear to coincide in the same spatial locus, it is not possible that two [distinct] physical entities could simultaneously coexist in one and the same spatial locus, because of the fact that their subserving bases in the [four types of] physical elements are different. 又非等故為喻不成。謂別 色生說名為像。其體實有理所不成。設成非等。故不成喻。言像不成故非喻者。以一處所無二並故。謂於 一處鏡色及像並見現前。二色不應同處並有。依異大故. (T1558.29.44b28–c1)

Here, it seems that you understand "not equivalent" as "the reflection" and "the mirror" not equivalent; and believe that the sentence "謂別色生說名為像，其體實有理所不成" also explains "又非等故為喻不成". This is inconsistent with my understanding. According to my understanding, not equivalent refers to "the relationship between the object and the reflection of the object" and "the relationship between death (死有) and rebirth (生有)" not equivalent, that is, the two relationships are not similar. The reason for "not equivalent" is: the former "is not a continuum" (非一相續), the latter "is a continuum" (是一相續). The sentence "謂別色生說名為像" explains "像實有不成", not "不等故非譬". "The reflection does not actually exist as entity" (像實有不成) and "not equivalent, so the two relationships are not similar" (不等故非譬) are two views of Vasubandhu. Vasubandhu expounded these two views in succession. "謂別色生說名為像" only explains the first view. Regarding the structure and logical relationship between the two views in this passage, I have tentatively marked them:

《阿毘達磨俱舍論》卷8：「

（1）像實有不成，

（2）不等故非譬。

（1）一處無二並，

（2）非相續二生，」(CBETA 2023.Q1, T29, no. 1558, p. 44b19-20)

《阿毘達磨俱舍論》卷8〈3 分別世品〉：「如是有情死有生有，處雖有間何妨續生？

（1）實有諸像理不成故，

（2）又非等故為喻不成。

（1）謂別色生說名為像，其體實有理所不成。

（2）設成非等，故不成喻。

（1）言像不成故非喻者，以一處所無二並故。謂於一處鏡色及像並見現前，二色不應同處並有，依異大故。又陿水上兩岸色形，同處一時俱現二像。居兩岸者互見分明，曾無一處並見二色，不應謂此二色俱生。又影與光未嘗同處，然曾見鏡懸置影中，光像顯然現於鏡面，不應於此謂二並生。或言一處無二並者，鏡面月像謂之為二，近遠別見如觀井水，若有並生如何別見？故知諸像於理實無。然諸因緣和合勢力令如是見，以諸法性功能差別難可思議。已辯不成所以非喻。

（2）言非等故亦非喻者，以質與像非相續故。謂質與像非一相續，唯依鏡等有像現故，像與本質俱時有故。如死生有是一相續前後無間餘處續生，質像相望無此相續，以不相似故不成喻。又所現像由二生故，謂二緣故諸像得生：一者本質、二者鏡等。二中勝者像依彼生，生有無容由二緣起，唯有死有無別勝依，故所引喻非等於法。亦不可說以外非情精血等緣為勝依性，由化生者空中欻生，於中計何為勝依性？

已依正理對破彼宗從死至生處容間絕，是故中有決定非無。」(CBETA 2023.Q1, T29, no. 1558, p. 44b26-c23)

4.

P14：The state of becoming reborn does not include [a gross physical support in the intermediate being], whereas the two physical conditions only arise in the state of becoming deceased, which lacks a distinctly predominant physical basis; therefore, the example cited [by the opponent] is not equivalent to the target property [of the state of becoming reborn]. Nor can one say that apart from the semen and blood, which are insentient, there is a distinctly predominant physical basis as the undergirding condition [of the state of becoming reborn]. Since upapādukas are spontaneously generated in space, which one of these two conditions serves as the predominant basis?

This passage is a translation of the following content: "生有無容由二緣起，唯有死有，無別勝依，故所引喻，非等於法。亦不可說以外非情精血等緣為勝依性，由化生者空中欻生，於中計何為勝依性?"

I don't think this translation is quite appropriate. I understand the original text to mean: the generation of an object's reflection requires two conditions: 1. The object itself; 2. A mirror or something similar to a mirror. However, the generation of "becoming reborn" (生有) has only one condition: becoming deceased (死有). Therefore, the relationship between "becoming deceased and becoming reborn" is not similar to the relationship between an object and its reflection. Some may say that the generation of "becoming reborn" also has a second condition: 1. Becoming deceased; 2. Semen and blood. But this view is inappropriate, because for upapādukas, there is no semen and blood.

5.

P10：Vasubandhu and Saṅghabhadra accept that the concept of interstitial space is required to explain two conventional aspects about ‘a reflection appearing in a mirror’. The first is that the reflection and the mirror are two separate entities; the second is that the reflec- tion and the mirror do not occupy the same physical place.

Here, I also have different views. I believe Vasubandhu did not accept the first one. He did not believe the reflection is an entity (實有). In fact, there was no dispute about whether the mirror and the object itself were entities. The dispute was only that Saṅghabhadra believed the reflection was an entity, while Vasubandhu believed it was not. As for the second point, whether the mirror and the reflection occupy the same physical place, Vasubandhu believed they did. This was an important basis for Vasubandhu to prove that the reflection was not an entity. Saṅghabhadra, on the contrary, believed they did not occupy the same physical place. We can also see from the Samayapradīpikā that Saṅghabhadra believed Vasubandhu insisted that the mirror and the reflection occupy the same physical place.

《阿毘達磨藏顯宗論》卷13：「然經主等立像無[3]因，謂一處所無二並故。彼謂一處鏡色及像並見現前，二色不應同處並有，依異大故。」(CBETA 2023.Q1, T29, no. 1563, p. 835a15-18)[3] 因【大】，由【宋】【元】【明】

《阿毘達磨藏顯宗論》卷13：「又鏡像色俱有對故必不同處，如何乃說一處鏡像並見現前？」(CBETA 2023.Q1, T29, no. 1563, p. 835b5-7)

6.

P10：Thus, Saṅghabhadra attempts to rehabilitate the example of the reflection as a valid exemplification of the spatiality of the intermediate state and guard it from the withering criticism levelled by Vasubandhu.

P11:In maintaining that the mirror-image and mirror- surface it is projected upon are both composed of real stuff of a physical nature, Saṅghabhadra repudiates Vasubandhu’s premise that a reflection is not a valid example of something physical. In doing so, Saṅghabhadra reinstates the Abhidharma postulate that the interstitial space existing between the reflection on the surface of the mirror, and the material stuff of the surface, exemplifies the physical properties characterizing the intermediate state as a real state of existence – in that both are distinguished by the specific property of being between two distinct physical bodies, both of which neces- sarily occupy separate and discrete spatial loci.

On this point, I also have different views. As mentioned earlier, Vasubandhu had two views: 1. The reflection does not actually exist as entity; 2. Not equivalent, so the two relationships are not similar. Saṅghabhadra only objected to Vasubandhu's first view and did not object to Vasubandhu's second view. Saṅghabhadra also believed that using the reflection to metaphorize "becoming reborn" was inappropriate. Because the relationship between "the object and the reflection" and the relationship between "becoming deceased and becoming reborn" are not similar, that is, "not equivalent". We can also confirm this from Samayapradīpikā.

《阿毘達磨藏顯宗論》卷13：「有情相續前後無間，於此處死餘處續生，但應引穀為同法喻，像非等故為喻不成。」(CBETA 2023.Q1, T29, no. 1563, p. 836b23-25)

《阿毘達磨順正理論》卷23：「又像形容屈伸俯仰及往來等，隨本質故，由斯證像連質而生。不可引為遮中有喻，非像無故為喻不成，但由非等壞隨質故。謂見諸像壞隨本質，生有亦隨死有滅者，有情相續[3]便有斷過。又諸像生似本質故，謂月等像定似本質，從牛等死有，應唯牛等生。既不許然，故喻非等。又從一質生多像故，謂隨質依生諸像位，可從一質隨對鏡等眾多所依遍生多像，非從一蘊相續死有多蘊相續生有俱生，故像於斯非為等喻。又質與像非相續故，謂質與像非一相續，像與本質俱時有故。諸相續者必不俱生，像質俱生故非相續。有情相續前後無間，於此處死、餘處續生，但應引穀為同法喻，像非等故為喻不成。」(CBETA 2023.Q1, T29, no. 1562, p. 473a24-b9)[3] 便【大】，相【宋】【元】【明】

邮件三：

First, Saṅghabhadra agreed with the principle that "剎那續生處必無間." The sentence "豈不世間亦見有色處雖間斷而得續生" opposed the principle of "剎那續生處必無間." That is to say, the reflection was used as an example to oppose the principle of "剎那續生處必無間." Therefore, Saṅghabhadra would not agree that the reflection was an example that could metaphorize "becoming reborn."

Second, the principle of "剎那續生處必無間" is somewhat different from what you said, "the principle that two distinct physical entities cannot be collocated in the same place at the same time." Indeed, Vasubandhu agreed with "the principle that two distinct physical entities cannot be collocated in the same place at the same time." Based on this principle, Vasubandhu denied "two entities" and only admitted one entity. However, did Saṅghabhadra also agree with "the principle that two distinct physical entities cannot be collocated in the same place at the same time?" I would like to cite a passage from Xuanzang's translation, that is, the "original text" I mentioned earlier, and try to interpret it.

《阿毘達磨順正理論》卷23：「且彼所說以一處所無二故者，其理不然，同處壁光俱可取故。雖壁光色異大為依，而於一時同處可取，不可亦撥在壁光無。由此例知鏡像俱有，故彼所說非遣像因。」(CBETA 2023.Q1, T29, no. 1562, p. 470b3-7)

The general idea is: Moreover, the "principle that two distinct physical entities cannot be collocated in the same place at the same time" said by Vasubandhu is not a valid principle because when light shines on the wall, the light and the wall are in the same place, and you can see the light and the wall at the same time. Although the "four great elements" that make up the light and the "four great elements" that make up the wall are different, they can be seen in the same place at the same time. You cannot say that the light is not on the wall. Therefore, this "principle" cannot be used to deny that both "the mirror and the reflection" exist as entities. So Vasubandhu's logic cannot be used to deny that "the reflection is entity."

In summary, Vasubandhu wanted to use the principle you mentioned to deny that "the reflection is entity," but Saṅghabhadra did not believe that "the mirror and the reflection" were in the same place at all. Therefore, that principle could not be used as a basis to deduce that "the reflection is not entity."

《阿毘達磨順正理論》卷23：「理但應言鏡像二色俱有對故，同處不成。同處既無，何言一處鏡色及像並見現前？若言處異不可取者，理亦不然，前已說故，謂壁光色亦同處可取。然有對故，理實處不同。雖處不同而可同取，如光壁理，鏡像亦然。」(CBETA 2023.Q1, T29, no. 1562, p. 470b14-19)

As for what you said, "I don't really get the logical coherence of accepting 2) but at the same time fervently denying 1).," I think these are two views, and you seem to have understood them as two parts of one view. Vasubandhu said this:

《阿毘達磨俱舍論》卷8〈3 分別世品〉：「設成非等，故不成喻。」(CBETA 2023.Q1, T29, no. 1558, p. 44b29-c1)

It means: Even if we assume that "the reflection is an entity 設成," the two relationships are "not equal 非等." Therefore, the metaphor is inappropriate  故不成喻. Here, "設" means conceding one step, giving up the assumption that "the reflection is not an entity 像實有不成," indicating that even so, the two relationships are "not equal." And in Saṅghabhadra's view, this is indeed the fact: The reflection is entity, but the metaphor does not hold.

Regarding why the metaphor does not hold, I would like to briefly explain the two passages cited in the previous email.

《阿毘達磨藏顯宗論》卷13：「有情相續前後無間，於此處死餘處續生，但應引穀為同法喻，像非等故為喻不成。」(CBETA 2023.Q1, T29, no. 1563, p. 836b23-25)

The relationship between "birth" and "death" should only be compared to the growth of "grains," and the reflection analogy is not appropriate.

《阿毘達磨順正理論》卷23：「又像形容屈伸俯仰及往來等，隨本質故，由斯證像連質而生。不可引為遮中有喻，非像無故為喻不成，但由非等。壞隨質故。謂見諸像壞隨本質，生有亦隨死有滅者，有情相續[3]便有斷過。

又諸像生似本質故，謂月等像定似本質，從牛等死有，應唯牛等生。既不許然，故喻非等。

又從一質生多像故，謂隨質依生諸像位，可從一質隨對鏡等眾多所依遍生多像，非從一蘊相續死有多蘊相續生有俱生，故像於斯非為等喻。

又質與像非相續故，謂質與像非一相續，像與本質俱時有故。諸相續者必不俱生，像質俱生故非相續。有情相續前後無間，於此處死、餘處續生。

但應引穀為同法喻，像非等故為喻不成。」(CBETA 2023.Q1, T29, no. 1562, p. 473a24-b9)[3] 便【大】，相【宋】【元】【明】

The reason why the reflection analogy is inappropriate is not because the reflection has no entity, but because of the following reasons:

1. The reflection will show the same changes as the things change, but "birth" will not change like "death". Specifically, when an object breaks, the reflection also breaks with it; but if "birth" breaks when "death" breaks, the continuity of life will not be established.

2. The reflection and the object are similar, the reflection of the moon is still the shape of the moon, but "birth" and "death" are not similar, otherwise, when a cow dies, it cannot be reborn as a human, it must still be a cow. But this is obviously absurd.

3. An object can produce multiple reflections, but from one "death," multiple "births" cannot be produced.

4. The object and the reflection must appear at the same time, but "death" and "birth" must not be simultaneous.

Therefore, it is appropriate to use grains as an analogy, and it is inappropriate to use reflection as an analogy.